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Spekkens has introduced a toy theory [Phys. Rev. A, 75, 032110 (2007)] in order to argue
for an epistemic view of quantum states. I describe a notation for the theory (excluding certain
joint measurements) which makes its similarities and differences with the quantum mechanics of
stabilizer states clear. Given an application of the qubit stabilizer formalism, it is often entirely
straightforward to construct an analogous application of the notation to the toy theory. This assists
calculations within the toy theory, for example of the number of possible states and transformations,
and enables superpositions to be defined for composite systems.
What is the quantum state? The ontic view holds that
it is a property of the physical system. The epistemic
view is that it merely represents some agent’s knowledge
about the system. To support the latter view, Spekkens
has constructed a toy theory [1] where the underlying
physical systems are classical yet many quantum features
are recovered through an epistemic restriction.
The states, transformations and measurements in the
toy theory bear a striking resemblance to those described
by the stabilizer formalism for qubits. That formalism
describes a non-trivial subset of the quantum mechanical
states, transformations and measurements of qubits in
a much more compact manner than the normal Hilbert
space formalism. A surprising consequence, known as
the Gottesman-Knill theorem, is that a non-trivial subset
of quantum mechanics can be efficiently simulated on a
classical computer. The subset is rich enough to include
many quantum phenomena, for instance entanglement,
non-locality, quantum teleportation and dense coding.
The formalism was originally developed [2] to study
quantum error correcting codes, but has seen widespread
use since, for example in the study of measurement based
quantum computation [3]. I will review the relevant parts
of the qubit stabilizer formalism during this paper. For
the reader that has never encountered it before, a full
introduction to that formalism can be found in Section
10.5 of [4], and further useful details in [5, 6].
The purpose of this paper is to provide a new notation
for the toy theory which explains the similarities with
the qubit stabilizer formalism, whilst also pinning down
exactly how the predictions of the toy theory differ from
those of quantum mechanics. A sneak preview of the
notation is given by Table I, showing how similar it is to
the qubit stabilizer formalism. The key difference is that
whilst for qubits XZ = −iY , in the toy theory XZ = Y.
The fact that the toy theory can be described using
a notation so similar to the qubit stabilizer formalism
may itself be considered further evidence for the epis-
temic view of quantum states.
The notation is also useful for carrying out calculations
in the theory, as shown by the examples in Section V.
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This is primarily for two reasons. Firstly the notation is
much more compact: the description of the key objects of
the theory (pure epistemic states and reversible transfor-
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Z1 → −Z1
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X1 → −X1,
Z1 → Z1
X1 → −X1,
Z1 → Z1
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−Z1Z2〉
5
{|Φ+〉 , |Φ−〉 ,
|Ψ+〉 , |Ψ−〉}
X1X2 and
Z1Z2
I
I
I
I
II
II
II
IIIII
III
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IV
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IV
X1X2 and
Z1Z2
TABLE I. Dense coding [7] in two theories (the quantum ver-
sion closely follows Section 2.3 of [4]), each in two notations.
For the benefit of those readers that are familiar with [1],
the column labelled “ontic space” reproduces the relevant di-
agrams from that paper. The remaining readers may ignore
that column. Initially the joint state of two systems indicated
in row 1 is prepared. Alice is given the first system and Bob
the second. In isolation, each system can only be used to
transmit a single bit of classical information, yet the dense
coding protocol allows two bits (b1, b2) to be sent from Al-
ice to Bob with the transfer of only one system. If b1 = 1
then Alice performs the operation indicated in row 2 on her
system. Similarly, if b2 = 1 she performs the operation indi-
cated in row 3. For example, if (b1, b2) = (1, 1) she performs
both operations and the joint state of the system is then as
shown in row 4. Finally, Alice sends her system to Bob, who
performs the joint measurement indicated in row 5 to recover
two bits of information.
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2mations) using the stabilizer notation scales polynomially
in the number of systems. A direct description, as used
in [1], scales exponentially. Secondly, there is widespread
experience with, and extensive literature on, the qubit
stabilizer formalism. Much of this can be applied to the
toy theory thanks to the notation provided here.
The use of the notation to describe states, transfor-
mations, and measurements is described in Sections I, II
and III respectively. Convex combinations and coherent
superpositions are discussed in Section IV.
Spekkens has already outlined a new phase-space based
formulation of the toy theory [8] which is closely related
to this notation as shown in Appendix B. The theory
has also been reformulated using category theory [9], but
since that is very different to the standard qubit stabilizer
formalism it does not facilitate calculations and compar-
isons in the same way as the notation provided here.
I. STATES
A. Qubits
Denote the 2 by 2 identity matrix by I and let
X =
(
0 1
1 0
)
, Y =
(
0 −i
i 0
)
, Z =
(
1 0
0 −1
)
. (1)
Define Pn, the Pauli group on n qubits, as the 2
n by
2n matrices of the form αp1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ pn for some α ∈
{1,−1, i,−i} and pk ∈ {I,X, Y, Z}. Call the Hermitian
elements (i.e. those with α ∈ {1,−1}) Pauli observables.
Define Xk as X acting on the k-th qubit, i.e. I
⊗(k−1) ⊗
X ⊗ I⊗(n−k). Similarly for Yk and Zk. Pn is generated
by the Xk and the Zk along with iI
⊗n.
An element g of the Pauli group, ignoring its phase α,
can be written as a check vector r(g). This is a vector
of 2n bits, where the first n bits give the locations of
Xs, whilst the second n bits give the locations of Zs, a
Y being indicates by 1s in both positions. For example,
r(X ⊗ Y ⊗ Z) = (1, 1, 0, 0, 1, 1), r(−Z ⊗ I) = (0, 0, 1, 0).
A useful property of check vectors is that r(gh) = r(g)⊕
r(h), where ⊕ indicates addition modulo 2 (making r a
group homomorphism from Pn to (Z2)2n).
Let S be a subgroup of Pn that does not contain −I⊗n
(a qubit stabilizer subgroup). It is conventional to asso-
ciate S with the subspace VS of pure states |ψ〉 satisfying
g |ψ〉 = |ψ〉 for all g ∈ S. The projector onto this sub-
space is [5]
PS =
1
|S|
∑
g∈S
g. (2)
For comparison with what follows it is useful instead
to associate S with the quantum state ρS = |S| 2−nPS .
This is a pure state if and only if |S| = 2n. Otherwise
it is a uniform mixture of 2
n
|S| pure states (which form a
basis for VS). States of this form are also considered in
[10] and [11].
For any Pauli observable g
Tr(gρS) =

1 g ∈ S
−1 −g ∈ S
0 otherwise
. (3)
In epistemic language we could say that ρS represents
complete knowledge about the Pauli observables g with
±g ∈ S and zero knowledge about the rest.
B. Toy theory
In Spekkens toy theory, the simplest systems, called
elementary systems, are always in one of the four pos-
sible ontic states. The ontic state is a “hidden vari-
able” that completely describes the physical state of af-
fairs of the system. In the stabilizer notation these on-
tic states are identified with the vectors ~e1 = (1, 0, 0, 0),
~e2 = (0, 1, 0, 0), ~e3 = (0, 0, 1, 0) and ~e4 = (0, 0, 0, 1).
A composite system is composed of elementary sys-
tems, and its ontic state is specified by specifying the
ontic state of each elementary system. For example 2 · 4
means that the first system is in ontic state 2 and the
second is in state 4. In the stabilizer notation this is
identified with the tensor product ~e2⊗~e4, whilst 1 ·3 ·2 is
identified with ~e1 ⊗ ~e3 ⊗ ~e2, and so on. In this way ontic
state for n elementary systems will therefore correspond
to a 4n-dimensional vector ~v with a single component
taking the value 1 and the rest zero.
An epistemic state describes an agent’s knowledge
about a system. An agent that assigns the epistemic
state 1∨ 2 to an elementary systems knows that its ontic
state is either 1 or 2. Crucial to Spekkens’ argument is
the observation that the epistemic states resemble quan-
tum states, whilst the ontic states do not.
Notice that the knowledge is incomplete: the agent
does not know the exact ontic state. This is required by
the theory’s “knowledge balance principle” [1]. Detailed
discussion of this principle is relegated to Appendix A,
where it is shown that the epistemic states satisfying it
are exactly those that can represented as follows:
Denote the 4 by 4 identity matrix by I = diag(1, 1, 1, 1)
and let
X = diag(1,−1, 1,−1), (4)
Y = diag(1,−1,−1, 1), (5)
Z = diag(1, 1,−1,−1). (6)
These correspond to the possible measurements of an
elementary system, where if the ontic state is k then a
measurement of g ∈ {I,X ,Y,Z} will return v ∈ {1,−1}
according to the eigenvalue equation g~ek = v~ek.
Define Gn as the 4
n by 4n matrices of the form αg1 ⊗
· · ·⊗gn for some α ∈ {1,−1} and gk ∈ {I,X ,Y,Z}. This
group plays the same role as the Pauli group does in the
qubit case. Call the elements toy observables. Denote
Xk = I⊗(k−1) ⊗ X ⊗ I⊗(n−k), and similarly for Yk and
3Picture Ontic states Toy stabilizers
1 ∨ 3 〈X 〉
2 ∨ 4 〈−X〉
1 ∨ 2 〈Z〉
3 ∨ 4 〈−Z〉
1 ∨ 4 〈Y〉
2 ∨ 3 〈−Y〉
1 ∨ 2 ∨ 3 ∨ 4 〈〉
TABLE II. All of the toy stabilizer subgroups for an elemen-
tary system. The filled boxes in the first column correspond
to the possible ontic states, as in [1]. The symbol ∨ should
be read as “or”.
Zk. Gn is generated by −I⊗n together with Xk and Zk
for all k ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
Let m : Gn → Pn be the mapping suggested by our no-
tation, so that m(−X ⊗Z) = −X ⊗Z and so on. Abuse
terminology by saying g, h ∈ Gn commute (anticommute)
if m(g) and m(h) commute (anticommute). Define the
check vector of g ∈ Gn to be r(m(g)), the check vector of
m(g). As with the qubit case, we have that multiplication
in Gn corresponds to addition of check vectors modulo
two. (Formally, r◦m : Gn → (Z2)2n is a group homomor-
phism, even though m : Gn → Pn is not. Furthermore,
appending a “phase bit” 12 (1 + α) to the check vector
gives a group isomorphism between Gn and (Z2)(2n+1).)
Let S be a subgroup of Gn that does not contain −I⊗n
and for which every g, h ∈ S commute (a toy stabilizer
subgroup). S represents an epistemic state for n elemen-
tary systems, namely the knowledge that the ontic state
~v satisfies g~v = ~v for all g ∈ S. This is a subgroup be-
cause if g~v = ~v and h~v = ~v then gh~v = ~v also. The
projector PS onto the ontic states compatible with S is
of the form (2).
Notice that whilst in the qubit case −I⊗n /∈ S auto-
matically ensures the elements of S commute, in the toy
theory the commuting requirement is added “by hand”.
The only element of S with non-zero trace is I⊗n and
so TrPS , which is the number of ontic states compatible
with S, is 4n/ |S|. Since we assume a uniform distribution
over the possible ontic states, ρs = |S| 4−nPS gives a
diagonal matrix of the probabilities for each ontic state.
Some examples of toy stabilizer subgroups are shown
in Tables II and III. They are all reminiscent of qubit
stabilizer states, and the following Lemma shows why.
Lemma 1 (proven in Appendix A). g1, g2, . . . , gl ∈ Gn
are independent generators of a toy stabilizer subgroup if
and only if m(g1),m(g2), . . . ,m(gl) are independent gen-
erators of a qubit stabilizer subgroup.
It is crucial to note that although valid lists of inde-
Picture Ontic states Toy stabilizers
(1 · 3) ∨ (1 · 4) ∨
(2 · 3) ∨ (2 · 4) 〈Z1,−Z2〉
(1 · 1) ∨ (2 · 2) ∨
(3 · 3) ∨ (4 · 4) 〈Z1Z2,X1X2〉
(1 · 2) ∨ (2 · 3) ∨
(3 · 4) ∨ (4 · 1) 〈−Z1Y2,−X1X2〉
(3∨4)·(1∨2∨3∨4) 〈−Z1〉
[(1∨ 3) · (2∨ 4)]∨
[(2 ∨ 4) · (1 ∨ 3)] 〈−X1X2〉
(1 ∨ 2 ∨ 3 ∨ 4) ·
(1 ∨ 2 ∨ 3 ∨ 4) 〈〉
(1·1·1)∨(1·2·2)∨
(2·1·2)∨(2·2·1)∨
(3·3·3)∨(3·4·4)∨
(4 ·3 ·4)∨ (4 ·4 ·3)
〈X1X2X3,Z1Z2,Z2Z3〉
TABLE III. Some toy stabilizer subgroups for composite sys-
tems. They are each composed of two elementary systems,
except for the last which is composed of three. The pictures
use the same conventions as in [1], briefly: each axis corre-
sponds to an elementary system, and the possible ontic states
are filled. In the two-system cases each row is a state of the
first system and each column a state of the second, with the
ontic state 1 ·1 in the bottom-left corner. In the three-system
case the “depth” gives the state of the third system, with the
ontic state 1 · 1 · 1 is in the bottom-left-back corner.
pendent generators are the same in both theories, the
resultant subgroups are in general different. For ex-
ample 〈X1X2,Y1Y2〉 = {I⊗2,X1X2,Y1Y2,Z1Z2} whilst
〈X1X2, Y1Y2〉 = {I⊗2, X1X2, Y1Y2,−Z1Z2}.
It is easy to see that if g1, · · · , gl are independent gen-
erators for S then |S| = 2l. The maximum number of
independent generators for a qubit stabilizer subgroup
is n [4], and the above lemma means this is also true
for toy stabilizer subgroups. Hence an S with |S| = 2n
represents a state of maximal knowledge, or a pure state.
Two epistemic states are called disjoint if no ontic state
is compatible with both. In this notation there is a use-
4ful criterion for disjoint states, which is identical to the
criterion for orthogonality in the qubit stabilizer case.
Lemma 2. A pair of toy stabilizer subgroups S, T ⊂ Gn
represent disjoint epistemic states if and only if there ex-
ists some g ∈ S with −g ∈ T .
Proof. S and T represent disjoint states if and only if
0 = PSPT = P〈S∪T 〉. This holds if and only if −I⊗n ∈
〈S ∪ T 〉. But since −I⊗n /∈ S, T , this holds if and only
if there exists g ∈ S with −g ∈ T .
Finally, note that the theory of qubits restricted to the
computational basis is just the classical probability the-
ory of bits. It is occasionally helpful to view the above
notation as being based on the encoding of the ontic level
of the toy theory (two classical bits per elementary sys-
tem) in the computational basis states of qubits. Since
X = I⊗Z, Y = Z⊗Z and Z = Z⊗I, the toy observables
are then Hermitian observables on those qubits. This de-
vice should not be taken too seriously, for example (as
discussed in Section III) a measurement of X can disturb
the value of Z in the toy theory, whereas the observables
I ⊗ Z and Z ⊗ I are compatible in quantum mechanics.
II. TRANSFORMATIONS
A. Qubits
Define Cn, the Clifford group on n qubits as the 2
n by
2n unitaries U satisfying UgU† ∈ Pn for all g ∈ Pn.
These take stabilizer states to stabilizer states, since
UρSU
† = ρT where T = {UgU†|g ∈ S} is another stabi-
lizer subgroup.
Since UghU† = UgU†UhU† we can specify the ac-
tion of U by its action on the generators of Pn. Since
UiI⊗nU† = iI⊗n it suffices to specify the action on the
Xk and Zk. Note that [UgU
†, UhU†] = U [g, h]U†. Hence
if UXkU
† = gk and UZkU† = hk we will have that the
gk commute, the hk commute, and gk commutes with hl
if and only if k 6= l. Since U is reversible we must have
that the hk and gk, together with iI
⊗n, generate Pn.
Such hk, gk are described in [5] as canonical genera-
tor sets. It is then shown that, conversely, for any given
canonical generator set there is a Clifford unitary that
maps the Xk and Zk to it. That unitary can be gen-
erated from the single qubit Clifford unitaries plus the
controlled-NOT gate, which sends X1 → X1X2, X2 →
X2, Z1 → Z1, Z2 → Z1Z2. Furthermore the single qubit
Clifford unitaries can themselves be generated from the
Hadamard gate, which sends X → Z,Z → X, and the
phase gate, which sends X → Y,Z → Z.
B. Toy theory
In the toy theory reversible transformations are permu-
tations of the ontic states that take any valid epistemic
state to another valid epistemic state. In this section I
show that the group of reversible transformations in the
toy theory has a very similar structure to the Clifford
group. The transformations act on the Xk and Zk in
the same way as the qubit case. Furthermore the trans-
formations can be generated in a similar fashion to the
Clifford group.
We can write a reversible transformation on n elemen-
tary systems as a 4n by 4n permutation matrix U . For
example, the permutation matrix for the permutation
1→ 2→ 3→ 1 on an elementary system is
U =
0 0 1 01 0 0 00 1 0 0
0 0 0 1
 (7)
If ~v is the ontic state before the transformation then U~v
is the state afterwards. Hence if we know that the ontic
state is in the support of a projector PS before then our
new knowledge is exactly that the ontic state is in the
support of the projector UPSU
T .
Before the transformation the epistemic state may have
been 〈g〉 for any g ∈ Gn. Since P〈g〉 = 12 (I⊗n+g), for the
new epistemic state to be valid (and hence represented
by a toy stabilizer subgroup) we must have UgUT ∈ Gn.
Compare this to the definition of the Clifford group. To
ensure the elements of the new subgroup commute we
must also require that UgUT and UhUT commute if and
only if g and h commute.
The theory now develops much like the qubit case.
Since UghUT = UgUTUhUT and U(−I⊗n)UT = −I⊗n
we can specify the action of U by its action on the Xk
and Zk. The resulting elements must have the same com-
mutation structure and, along with −I⊗n, generate Gn.
Call such elements canonical generating sets, and note
that applying m gives a qubit canonical generator set.
For an elementary system, it is shown in Table IV that
all of the 4! = 24 permutations of the ontic states are
valid, and that there is a permutation that sends the X
and Z to any canonical generator set.
It is well known that the group of permutations on
n elements can be generated by a transposition and an
n-cycle. Hence any elementary transformation can be
written as a sequence of, for example 3 ↔ 2 and 1 →
4→ 2→ 3→ 1 transformations. The first is reminiscent
of a Hadamard gate in that it maps X → Z and Z → X ,
although it maps Y → Y whereas a Hadamard maps
Y → −Y . The second is reminiscent of a phase gate in
that it maps X → Y and Y → −X , although it maps
Z → −Z whereas a phase gate maps Z → Z.
The argument in [5] now gives that there is a permuta-
tion on a composite system that sends the Xk,Zk to any
given canonical generator set, and that it can be gen-
erated using the elementary system transformations and
the controlled-NOT gate shown in Table V.
One difference between the transformations in the two
theories has already been noted: transformations that act
on Xk and Zk in the same way in both theories do not
5Permutation Effect on toy stabilizers
(1)(2)(3)(4) X → X , Z → Z
(1)(2)(43) X → Y, Z → Z
(1)(32)(4) X → Z, Z → X
(1)(342) X → Y, Z → X
(1)(432) X → Z, Z → Y
(1)(42)(3) X → X , Z → Y
(21)(3)(4) X → −Y, Z → Z
(21)(43) X → −X , Z → Z
(231)(4) X → Z, Z → −Y
(2341) X → −X , Z → −Y
(2431) X → Z, Z → −X
(241)(3) X → −Y, Z → −X
(321)(4) X → −Y, Z → X
(3421) X → −Z, Z → X
(31)(2)(4) X → X , Z → −Y
(341)(2) X → −Z, Z → −Y
(31)(42) X → X , Z → −Z
(3241) X → −Y, Z → −Z
(4321) X → −X , Z → Y
(421)(3) X → −Z, Z → Y
(431)(2) X → Y, Z → −X
(41)(2)(3) X → −Z, Z → −X
(4231) X → Y, Z → −Z
(41)(32) X → −X , Z → −Z
TABLE IV. The valid reversible transformations for an ele-
mentary system. The first column shows the permutations to
the ontic states in cycle notation, for example (342) indicates
that 3 → 4 → 2 → 3. The second shows the result of UgUT
on two non-trivial generators of G1.
necessarily act in the same way on other group elements,
for example the Yk. Another difference is that whilst
commutation structure is automatically preserved by any
unitary transformation on qubits, this requirement must
be added “by hand” in the toy theory. For example, the
matrix U for the two-system permutation
1 · 2↔ 3 · 1, 1 · 4↔ 3 · 3, 2 · 2↔ 4 · 1, 2 · 4↔ 4 · 3 (8)
satisfies the requirement that UgU† ∈ G2 for all g ∈ G2,
but has UX1UT = X1 and UX2UT = Z1 and so is not a
valid transformation.
III. MEASUREMENTS
A. Qubits
Suppose a Pauli observable g is measured on a state
described by S. If ±g ∈ S then ±1 is returned and the
state is unchanged.
If ±g /∈ S, then the result v ∈ {1,−1} will be com-
pletely random. To find the state after the measurement,
first write down a set of independent generators for S
with at most one element h that anticommutes with g.
(Any other elements that anticommute can be multiplied
by h.) Add vg to the list and remove h (if present) to
obtain a list of independent generators for the new state.
Permutation Effect on toy stabilizers
X1 → −Y1, X2 → X2,
Z1 → Z1, Z2 → −Y2
X1 → X1X2, X2 → X2,
Z1 → Z1, Z2 → Z1Z2
TABLE V. Two reversible transformations for pairs of ele-
mentary systems. The first column shows the permutations
to the ontic states (laid out in a grid using the same con-
ventions as [1] and Table III). The second shows the action
on the non-trivial generators of G2. The first transformation
acts on each system separately. The second transformation is
analogous to a controlled-NOT.
B. Toy theory
A measurement in the toy theory is specified by par-
titioning the ontic state into valid epistemic states. The
result of the measurement is simply whichever member
of the partition the ontic state lies in. In order to ensure
that the new epistemic state is valid, the measurement
must disturb the ontic state.
In the toy stabilizer notation we can describe mea-
surements of toy observables g, i.e. the partitioning of
the ontic states into 〈g〉 and 〈−g〉. In this section I will
show that that measurements of toy observables behave
in exactly the same way as Pauli observables in the qubit
case, but that not every measurement in the toy theory
can be described using toy observables.
Let the epistemic state before the measurement be de-
scribed by a toy stabilizer subgroup S. If g ∈ S then all
the possible ontic states lie in the +1 eigenspace of g, so
we are certain to get the +1 outcome. Similarly if −g ∈ S
we are certain to get the −1 outcome. Notice that the
expected value of g is Tr(gρS). If g,−g /∈ S then this
gives 0. Hence the measurement of such a toy observable
must give either outcome with equal probability.
In order to ensure that the epistemic state after the
measurement is valid, there must be a random distur-
bance to the value of any anticommuting toy observables.
Let us assume this is the only disturbance - all commut-
ing observables are unaffected.
If ±g was already in the subgroup then there is no
change to the epistemic state. Otherwise, if the outcome
of a measurement is ±1 the new toy stabilizer subgroup
will be generated by ±g and the old stabilizer subgroup
without any elements that anticommute with g. A sys-
tematic way to update the toy stabilizer subgroup is to
follow the qubit stabilizer procedure: write a list of in-
6dependent generators for the old state with at most one
element that anticommutes with g, delete that element
if present, and add ±g.
An example of a valid measurement with four outcomes
is the partitioning of the ontic states into those associ-
ated with 〈X1X2,Z1Z2〉, 〈−X1X2,Z1Z2〉, 〈Z1,−Z2〉 and
〈−Z1,Z2〉. This measurement can be handled in the sta-
bilizer notation by first considering a measurement of
Z1Z2. The +1 outcome means that the ontic state must
lie in one of the first two sets and we can measure X1X2
to determine which. Similarly the −1 outcome narrows
it down to the last two sets and we then measure Z1.
Can every valid measurement be described using se-
quences of toy observables in this way? Somewhat sur-
prisingly, the answer is no.
Lemma 3 (proven in Appendix A). Any valid measure-
ment on one or two elementary systems is equivalent to
measuring a sequence of toy observables.
Lemma 4. Not every valid measurement on three or
more elementary systems is equivalent to measuring a
sequence of toy observables.
Proof. Consider the measurement on three or more ele-
mentary systems with eight outcomes
〈Z1,Z2,X3〉 , 〈−Z1,X2,Z3〉 , 〈X1,−Z2,−Z3〉 ,
〈Z1,Z2,−X3〉 , 〈−Z1,−X2,Z3〉 , 〈−X1,−Z2,−Z3〉 ,
〈Z1,−Z2,Z3〉 , 〈−Z1,Z2,−Z3〉 .
(9)
There is no non-trivial toy observable g with ±g in all
the outcome subgroups (indeed there is no such g for
the first three outcomes alone). Therefore there is no g
that can be the first in the sequence of toy observable
measurements.
Since the only valid measurements on elementary sys-
tems are toy observables (Lemma 3), the above set of
eight uncorrelated (product) states cannot be distin-
guished using local measurements alone. The same situ-
ation arises in quantum mechanics, where it is known as
“non-locality without entanglement” [12]. Indeed equa-
tion 43 in [12] is very similar to (9). As noted in [1], the
presence of this effect in the toy theory, which is local
by construction, may indicate that “non-locality without
entanglement” is a misnomer.
A similar structure also arises in so-called “boxworld”
[13]: the measurement in their proof of Theorem 3 is also
reminiscent of (9).
IV. MIXTURES AND SUPERPOSITIONS
A. Qubits
I have been unable to find procedures for construct-
ing mixtures (convex combinations) and superpositions
of qubit stabilizer states in the literature, so I briefly de-
velop the theory here.
Let S and S′ be two stabilizer subgroups on n qubits.
When g ∈ S if and only if ±g ∈ S′, call S′ a rephasing
of S. In that case, either S = S′, or they represent or-
thogonal states and can be written S = 〈g1, . . . , gl−1, gl〉,
S′ = 〈g1, . . . , gl−1,−gl〉. For example, S′ = 〈Z1,−Z2〉
is a rephasing of S = 〈−Z1, Z2〉. For each list of gen-
erators we then multiply first by the second to obtain
S′ = 〈−Z1Z2,−Z2〉, S = 〈−Z1Z2, Z2〉.
Consider the mixture 12 (ρS + ρS′). It is easy to check
that the result is equal to to ρT for some stabilizer sub-
group T if and only if S′ is a rephasing of S. In that case
T = S ∩S′ and PT ∝ PS +P ′S . For example, with S and
S′ as above we would have T = 〈−Z1Z2〉.
The rephasing condition also applies to coherent su-
perpositions, provided we restrict attention to orthogo-
nal states. This excludes somewhat irregular cases such
as |00〉 − |++〉, which happens to be a stabilizer state.
Lemma 5 (proven in Appendix A). Let S, S′, T be sta-
bilizer subgroups of size 2n. Let S and S′ stabilize or-
thogonal states |ψ〉 and |ψ′〉 respectively. Then there ex-
ists a θ ∈ R such that T stabilizes 1√
2
(|ψ〉 + eiθ |ψ′〉) if
and only if we can write S = 〈g1, . . . , gn−1, gn〉, S′ =
〈g1, . . . , gn−1,−gn〉 and T = 〈g1, . . . , gn−1, h〉 for some
h /∈ S ∪ S′.
There are always four such superpositions:
Lemma 6 (proven in Appendix A). Let S =
〈g1, . . . , gn−1, gn〉 and S′ = 〈g1, . . . , gn−1,−gn〉. Then
there are exactly four distinct stabilizer subgroups of the
form 〈g1, . . . , gn−1, h〉 with h /∈ S ∪ S′.
For example, take S = 〈Z1, Z2〉 and S′ = 〈−Z1,−Z2〉,
which correspond to |00〉 and |11〉 respectively. Then
we obtain four distinct superpositions of the form T =
〈Z1Z2, h〉 by setting h to ±X1X2 or ±X1Y2, correspond-
ing to 1√
2
(|00〉 ± |11〉) or 1√
2
(|00〉 ± i |11〉) respectively.
B. Toy theory
Define rephasing for toy stabilizer subgroups in the
same way. Convex combinations then work in exactly the
same way as the qubit case. If S and S′ represent disjoint
states then PS +PS′ is a projector onto the union of the
epistemic states compatible with S and S′, which is how
convex combinations are defined in [1]. Defining convex
combinations for any rephasing also allows S = S′, which
is a trivial extension.
Since the toy theory does not have a direct analogue of
Hilbert space there is no inherent definition of a coher-
ent superposition. Instead we simply define it by anal-
ogy to the qubit case. Suppose S and S′ are two toy
stabilizer subgroups for pure states, and S is a rephas-
ing of S′. Then either S = S′ (in which case we can
trivially define S to be a coherent superposition of S
and S′), or we can write S = 〈g1, . . . , gn−1, gn〉 and
S′ = 〈g1, . . . , gn−1,−gn〉. Call an epistemic state of the
7form T = 〈g1, . . . , gn−1, h〉 with h /∈ S ∪ S′ a uniform
coherent superposition of S and S′.
This definition generalizes the coherent superpositions
for elementary systems found in [1] to composite sys-
tems. For any pair of distinct epistemic states, one being
a rephasing of the other, there are four distinct coher-
ent superpositions (using the same proof as for Lemma 6
above). The epistemic states thus obtained contain ontic
states from both of the epistemic states in the superpo-
sition.
It was shown in Section II that for any pair of canonical
generating sets, there is a permutation which maps one
to the other. Take S, S′ and a coherent superposition
T written as above. Write a canonical generating set
g1, . . . , gn, h1, . . . , hn. Fix hn = h (h anticommutes with
gn by the same argument used in the proof of Lemma 5).
The other hk are irrelevant, provided they satisfy the
requirements of a canonical generator set (such hk can
always be found). Another canonical generating set is
obtained by changing gn to h and hn to −gn. So there
exists a permutation that sends S to T and T to S′.
This is considered in [1] to be indicative of a coherent
superposition.
V. EXAMPLES
In this section the computational power of the nota-
tion is used to demonstrate some similarities of the toy
theory to qubit stabilizers not identified in [1]. On the
other hand, to show why not every phenomena involving
qubit stabilizers is found in the toy theory, this section
concludes with a discussion of the Mermin-Peres square.
A. Counting states and transformations
The number of pure stabilizer states on n qubits is
calculated in [10] to be
2n
n−1∏
k=0
(2n−k + 1). (10)
Their argument applies equally to toy stabilizers and so
the number of pure epistemic states for n elementary
systems in the toy theory is identical.
The number of ordered canonical generator sets, and
hence the elements of the Clifford group (modulo global
phases) is calculated in [5] to be
22n
2+3n
n∏
k=1
(1− 2−2k). (11)
The same argument applies equally to toy stabilizers and
so, recalling the link between transformations and canon-
ical generator sets outlined in Section II, the number of
valid reversible transformations in the toy theory is iden-
tical.
B. Classical simulation
It was already noted in [1] that the ontic states of the
toy theory can be tracked efficiently by a classical com-
puter. Using the stabilizer notation a classical computer
can furthermore efficiently track the epistemic state. In-
deed the proof in [10] that the simulation of qubit sta-
bilizer circuits is complete for the classical complexity
class ⊕L (which is believed to be strictly weaker than
P, polynomial-time universal classical computation) can
now easily be adapted to the toy theory.
C. Graph states
Let G be a finite simple graph on n vertices. We can
associate G with a pure state on n elementary systems
as follows. Begin with each system in the state 〈X 〉. Ap-
ply the two-system permutation that sends X1 → X1Z2,
X2 → Z1X2, Z1 → Z1 and Z2 → Z2 (analogous to a
controlled-Z gate) to each pair of systems connected by
an edge on the graph (in any order). The toy stabilizer
subgroup for the resulting state is generated by
gk = Xk
∏
l∈N(k)
Zl (12)
for k ∈ {1, . . . , n} where N(k) are the vertices connected
to vertex k.
Such states are analogous to graph states on qubits
[14], and share many qualitative features with them. For
example, a Zk commutes with all of the generators ex-
cept for gk. Hence a Z measurement on the k-th system
will return ±1 with equal probability and generators for
the new toy stabilizer can be found by replacing gk with
±Zk. By multiplying the gl with l ∈ N(k) by this we ob-
tain another list of generators. If the value −1 is returned
then apply the transformation that sends X → −X and
Z → Z to the systems in N(k). The new generators
are now those of the graph state for G with the vertex
k deleted, along with ±Zk. Compare this to the qubit
case, Proposition 1 of [14]. The effect of X and Y mea-
surements is also analogous to the qubit case.
D. Non-example: Mermin-Peres square
Having seen all these examples it may tempting to con-
clude that any feature of the qubit stabilizer formalism
has an analogue in the toy theory. This is not the case.
The Mermin-Peres square [15] of 9 Pauli observables
X1 X2 X1X2
Y2 Y1 Y1Y2
X1Y2 Y1X2 Z1Z2
(13)
has the property that every row and column is a set of
commuting observables that multiply to give I⊗2, ex-
cept for the last row which gives −I⊗2. Suppose we
8replace every observable in the square with some pre-
determined value ±1, which is independent of how the
observable is measured (non-contextual). To agree with
quantum mechanical predictions each row and column of
the square must multiply to 1, except the last row which
must multiply to −1. Since this is impossible, we con-
clude that in quantum mechanics observables do not have
pre-determined non-contextual values.
The square of toy observables corresponding to (13)
has the property that every row and column is a set of
commuting observables that multiply to give I⊗2. Hence
the corresponding values must multiply to 1, and this
does not give rise to a contradiction. This is to be ex-
pected since in the toy theory all toy observables do in-
deed have a pre-determined non-contextual value, which
could be calculated if the exact ontic state were known.
VI. SUMMARY
The similarities and differences between the qubit sta-
bilizer formalism and Spekkens’ toy theory can be sum-
marised as follows. States, transformations, and mea-
surements in their most compressed representation – in-
dependent generators, canonical generator sets, and ob-
servables respectively – appear to be identical in both
theories and are manipulated according to the same pro-
cedures.
Yet the underlying groups Gn and Pn are by no means
identical, and so the results of “decompression” – calcu-
lation of the full subgroup of a state, and the effect of
a transformation on all observables – will usually differ.
This is the key difference between the two theories.
With the notation in hand it becomes much easier to
make calculations in the theory. This enables proofs of
two important facts not shown in [1]: that the number
of epistemic states on n elementary systems is equal to
the number of stabilizer states on n qubits, and a simi-
lar result for transformations. Whilst dealing with just
three elementary systems was previously very difficult,
the stabilizer notation makes the consideration of states
on a arbitrary number of elementary systems tractable.
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Appendix A: Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1. The second statement is equivalent
to “m(g1),m(g2), . . . ,m(gl) commute, have linearly in-
dependent check vectors, and each square to I⊗n” [5].
By definition check vectors and commuting conditions
are preserved by m. Furthermore m(g)
2
= I⊗n since the
only elements of Pn that don’t square to I
⊗n are those
with phases α ∈ {i,−i}, which aren’t in the image of m.
Hence the second statement is equivalent to
“g1, g2, . . . , gl commute and have linearly indepen-
dent check vectors”. The proof is completed by showing
that this is equivalent to the first statement using a
similar argument to the qubit case [5]. First note
that g1, g2, . . . , gl commute if and only if 〈g1, g2, . . . , gl〉
commute.
Suppose −I⊗n ∈ 〈g1, g2, . . . , gl〉. Then the check vec-
tor of −I⊗n can be written is a linear combination of
the check vectors of g1, g2, . . . , gl. But the check vector
of −I⊗n is 0 and so the check vectors of g1, g2, . . . , gl
are linearly dependent. Suppose that the first statement
holds but the check vectors of g1, g2, . . . , gl are linearly
dependent. Then the check vector of one of them, say
of g1, can be written as a linear combination of the oth-
ers. That means that either g1 or −g1 can be written
as a product of the others. The first possibility con-
tradicts the assumption of independent generators, and
since g1(−g1) = −I⊗n the second contradicts the as-
sumption that the subgroup does not contain −I⊗n.
Lemma 7. An epistemic state is permitted by the toy
theory if and only if it corresponds to a toy stabilizer
subgroup.
Proof. In order to prove that the toy stabilizer sub-
groups correspond exactly to the valid epistemic states
of Spekkens’ toy theory, we need a precise formulation of
the valid states for n elementary systems. Define them
inductively as follows. An epistemic state is a subset of
the ontic states (which we assign a uniform probability
distribution over). For n = 1 a valid epistemic state con-
sists of either two or four ontic states. Suppose the valid
states are defined for n ≤ k. Define a valid measure-
ment on n ≤ k elementary systems as the discovery of
which member of a partition of the ontic states into valid
epistemic states the ontic state lies in. A valid epistemic
state on n = k + 1 elementary systems is such that for
any non-trivial partition of the elementary systems into
two subsystems A and B, any possible outcome of any
valid measurement of A (which is assumed not to affect
the ontic state of B) results in a valid epistemic state for
B.
The definition of the “knowledge balance principle” in
[1] is not as mathematical as the one above. Since the
valid epistemic states of an elementary system are stated
explicitly in [1], the definitions certainly agree for n = 1.
For n > 1 the inductive structure made explicit above is
implicit in [1]: examples are given of particular epistemic
states of a composite system, such that a measurement on
one subsystem leads to an invalid epistemic state for the
other. This is always taken as proof that the epistemic
state of the composite system was invalid, the validity of
the definitions for the smaller subsystems is never ques-
tioned.
9Also implicit in [1] is that for any epistemic state on
n elementary systems, there must exist a canonical set
such that the agent is certain about the answers to l of
the questions, and completely ignorant of the remaining
2n− l. Hence the number of ontic states compatible with
the epistemic state must be 2(2n−l). This implicit require-
ment rules out the epistemic state 1∨2∨3. Furthermore,
by the knowledge balance principle we must have l ≤ n.
Except for when n = 1, this requirement might appear
to be missing from the above definition. But since the
Lemma can be proven without it, and any state corre-
sponding to a toy stabilizer subgroup certainly satisfies
this requirement, it turns out that there is no need to
include it in the definition.
We now proceed with the proof using induction on
n. The only toy stabilizer subgroups for n = 1 are
〈〉 , 〈X 〉 , 〈−X〉 , 〈Y〉 , 〈−Y〉 , 〈Z〉 and 〈−Z〉 which corre-
spond to the 7 valid epistemic states for an elementary
system.
Suppose the claim has been proved for all n ≤ k and
consider an epistemic state of an n = k + 1 system. For
the “if” part let S be a toy stabilizer subgroup. Con-
sider a non-trivial partitioning into subsystems A and
B of sizes nA and nB . Since nA, nB < k we can as-
sume the lemma holds for each. Therefore some outcome
of some valid measurement of A corresponds to a valid
epistemic state and hence a toy stabilizer subgroup for A,
which we denote N ′. Tensor the operators in N ′ with an
I⊗nB to obtain the corresponding knowledge about the
entire system, denoted N . It is now known that before
the measurement the ontic state was in the support of
PNPS = P〈N∪S〉.
〈N ∪ S〉may not represent a valid epistemic state since
we have not yet taken into account the disturbance to
A due to the measurement. But since system B is not
disturbed the new epistemic state for B alone will be
given by the subgroup SB of 〈N ∪ S〉 that applies to
B alone. It is useful to note that since Gn is abelian,
〈N ∪ S〉 = {gh|g ∈ N,h ∈ S}.
Since neither N nor S contain −I⊗n, the only way
−I⊗n could be in 〈N ∪ S〉 is if there is some g ∈ N with
−g ∈ S. But then the measurement would never have
returned the result it did. Hence −I⊗n /∈ 〈N ∪ S〉.
Let g, h ∈ SB , and decompose g = ab, h = cd with
a, c ∈ N and b, d ∈ S. We have that a commutes with c
and b commutes with d. Since a, c ∈ N are results from a
measurement of A alone we can write a = aA⊗I⊗nB and
c = cA⊗I⊗nB with aA, cA ∈ GnA . Since g, h ∈ SB apply
to B alone we must have b = aA ⊗ bB and d = cA ⊗ dB
with bB , dB ∈ GnB . This demonstrates that a commutes
with d and b commutes with c also. Therefore g and h
commute. Hence SB is a toy stabilizer subgroup, which
represents a valid epistemic state by the inductive hy-
pothesis. Therefore S represents a valid epistemic state.
For the “only if” part consider some valid epistemic
state. First I show that the probability of obtaining an
outcome from the measurement of a toy observable is al-
ways either 0, 12 or 1. Let g
+ be the event of obtaining
the +1 outcome from measuring some g ∈ Gn. Decom-
pose g = a⊗b with a ∈ G1 and b ∈ Gn−1. If g~v = ~v then,
writing ~v = ~va ⊗ ~vb we must have a~va = ~va, b~vb = ~vb or
a~va = −~va and b~vb = −~vb. Hence
P (g+) = P (a+ ∩ b+) + P (a− ∩ b−)
= P (a+)P (b+|a+) + P (a−)P (b−|a−). (A1)
All of the probabilities in the last expression are 0, 12 or 1
by the inductive hypothesis and the fact that measuring a
will result in a valid epistemic state for the other subsys-
tem. Hence the only way P (g+) could fail to be 0, 12 or 1
is if P (a+) = P (a−) = 12 and (P (b
+|a+), P (b−|a−)) ∈
{(0, 12 ), ( 12 , 0), ( 12 , 1), (1, 12 )}. But by the inductive hy-
pothesis P (b+) ∈ {0, 12 , 1}, and we have
P (b+) = P (b+|a+)P (a+) + P (b+|a−)P (a−), (A2)
which would give a contradiction in each of those four
cases.
We now construct a list of independent generators for
the toy stabilizer subgroup corresponding to the valid
epistemic state as follows. Identify the first elementary
system as subsystem A and the rest as a subsystem B.
Consider an I measurement on system A, which is valid
by the inductive hypothesis. This is certain to return
the outcome 1 and results in a valid epistemic state for
B. By the inductive hypothesis this corresponds to a
toy stabilizer subgroup SB , which will have some list of
independent generators. Tensor each element of this list
with I to obtain the first generators for S.
Next consider an 〈X 〉 versus 〈−X〉 measurement on A
(i.e. a measurement of the X toy observable). If we know
that only a single outcome, ±1 is possible then doing the
measurement cannot give us any knowledge about system
B that we didn’t already have. Therefore we just need
to add ±XA⊗I⊗(n−1) to our generators for S (it is clear
that this commutes with, and has a linearly independent
check vector from, the existing elements of the list).
If either outcome is possible then they must result in
valid epistemic states and hence toy stabilizer subgroups
S±B . Suppose there is a g ∈ S+B with neither g nor −g in
S−B . Recall that the measurement of A does not disturb
B. Consider a g measurement on system B and denote
the event of the +1 outcome g+. Denote the event of a
±1 outcome of the X measurement on A by X±. Then
we have
P (g+) = P (g+|X+)× P (X+) + P (g+|X−)× P (X−)
= 1× 1
2
+
1
2
× 1
2
=
3
4
(A3)
contradicting the earlier proof that P (g+) ∈ {0, 12 , 1}.
There is a similar contradiction if there is g ∈ S−B
with neither g nor −g in S+B . Hence (in the language
of Section IV) S−B is a rephasing of S
+
B . Therefore either
S+B = S
−
B (in which case the measurement provides no in-
formation about B and we do nothing), or we can write a
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list of independent generators for S±B as g1, . . . , gl−1,±gl.
g1, . . . , gl−1 hold for either outcome so they must already
be in S. Hence we just need to add X ⊗ gl to our gen-
erators for S. It is clear that the list still commutes and
has linearly independent check vectors.
Now consider a Y measurement on A and repeat the
process. If there is a new gl, it must anticommute with
the old (if present), since otherwise we could measure
two commuting toy observables and determine the value
of both X and Y on system A. Hence the new generator
Y ⊗ gl commutes with the one added in the previous
step, and certainly commutes with all the rest and has a
linearly independent check vector.
Finally repeat the process for a Z measurement on A,
but don’t add a generators with a check vector linearly
dependent on the existing ones. Any such element will
already be in the subgroup.
Consider the measurement of some toy observable g
with neither g nor −g in S. It must either return one
outcome with certainty, or either outcome with equal
probability. In the former case it will be possible to find
some contradiction with the above procedure, i.e. to find
a reason why g or −g would have been added to S. The
latter case is exactly what is predicted by the toy stabi-
lizer subgroup S.
We have now constructed a toy stabilizer subgroup S
whose corresponding epistemic state makes identical pre-
dictions about the expectation values of all toy observ-
ables. It remains to show that that there is only one
epistemic state with this property and hence S repre-
sents exactly the epistemic state we began with. This
is analogous to the fact that knowing the expectation
values of every Pauli observable uniquely determines a
quantum state, and the proof is similar. We note that
the elements G+n of Gn that have α = 1 are a basis for
the real vector space of real diagonal 4n × 4n matrices.
This is true because there are 4n of them, and they are
orthogonal under the trace inner product and hence lin-
early independent. Hence any probability distribution
over the ontic states, written as a diagonal real 4n × 4n
matrix, is a linear combination of the G+n where the co-
efficients are proportional to the expectation values of
those observables.
Proof of Lemma 3. For one system this can be seen by
inspection.
Consider a four-outcome valid measurement on two
systems and represent the outcomes, which are valid epis-
temic states, by toy stabilizer subgroups S1, S2, S3, S4. I
claim there are three toy observable g, h± with {g, h+},
{g,−h+}, {−g, h−}, {−g,−h−} each contained in one
of the Sk. Hence the measurement can be implemented
by measuring g, and then, based on the outcome ±1,
measuring h±. For example if S1 = 〈X1X2,Y1Y2〉, S2 =
〈−X1X2,−Y1Y2〉, S3 = 〈Z1,−Z2〉 and S4 = 〈−Z1,Z2〉
we can take g = Z1Z2, h+ = X1X2 and h− = Z1.
First note that since the Sk are disjoint and cover all
the ontic states
PS1 + PS2 + PS3 + PS4 = I⊗2. (A4)
Denote S1 = {I⊗2, a, b, ab}, where a and b are inde-
pendent generators of S1. By (A4) −a, −b and −ab
must appear in the other Sk. Suppose without loss
of generality that −a appears in S2 and denote S2 =
{I⊗2,−a, c,−ac}. If c = b then by (A4) we have
−b ∈ S3, S4 and so we can take g = b. Similarly if c = −b
take g = ab, if c = ab take g = ab and if c = −ab take
g = b. Suppose c is otherwise. Since −b, −c and −ac
must be in S3 or S4, two of them must be in the same
subgroup. If −c and −ac are in the same subgroup then
a is also in it and so by (A4) we can take g = a. If −b
and −c are in the same subgroup then they must com-
mute. But then {a, b, c} would be independent generators
of a toy stabilizer subgroup, even though the maximum
length of such a list is n = 2. Similarly if −b and −ac
being in the same subgroup creates a contradiction using
{a, b, ac}.
Once we have found g, use (A4) to verify that g must
be in two of the subgroups and −g must be in the other
two. Take the two subgroups with g in. To ensure that
they represent disjoint states there must be some h+ in
one with −h+ in the other. Define h− similarly.
The proofs for a valid measurement with two or three
outcomes are simpler, but use similar observations.
Proof of Lemma 5. We begin with the “if” part. For any
θ ∈ R and l ∈ {1, . . . , n − 1} we have gl |ψ〉 = |ψ〉 and
gl |ψ′〉 = |ψ′〉, hence
gl
1√
2
(|ψ〉+ eiθ |ψ′〉) = 1√
2
(|ψ〉+ eiθ |ψ′〉). (A5)
Next calculate the effect of h on |ψ〉. Since T is a
stabilizer subgroup h must commute with g1, . . . , gn−1.
But it must anticommute with gn since otherwise
g1, . . . , gn1 , gn, h would be a list of n+1 independent gen-
erators of a stabilizer subgroup, contradicting the maxi-
mum length of such a list being n. Therefore under con-
jugation by h, S is mapped to S′. Hence h |ψ〉 = eiθ |ψ′〉
for some θ ∈ R. Since h is Hermitian and unitary we
also have heiθ |ψ′〉 = |ψ〉. Therefore h 1√
2
(|ψ〉+eiθ |ψ′〉) =
1√
2
(|ψ〉+eiθ |ψ′〉), and we have that T stabilizes this state.
Now for the “only if” part. Suppose S′ is not a rephas-
ing of S. Then there exists some g ∈ S with ±g /∈ S′.
Denote |φ(θ)〉 = 1√
2
(|ψ〉+ eiθ |ψ′〉 and calculate
〈φ(θ) | g |φ(θ)〉 = 1
2
(〈ψ | g |ψ〉+ 〈ψ′ | g |ψ′〉
+ eiθ 〈ψ | g |ψ′〉+ e−iθ 〈ψ′ | g |ψ〉) = 1
2
, (A6)
which contradicts the expectation value of any Pauli ob-
servable in a stabilizer state being −1, 0 or 1.
So S′ is a rephasing of S. Since S′ 6= S we can therefore
write S = 〈g1, . . . , gn−1, gn〉 and S = 〈g1, . . . , gn−1,−gn〉.
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It is easy to check that for l ∈ {1, . . . , n − 1} we have
gl |φ(θ)〉 = |φ(θ)〉 and hence gl ∈ T . Therefore we can
take g1, . . . , gn−1 as the first n − 1 independent gener-
ators of T . Write the final independent generator as
h. Suppose h ∈ S. Since h /∈ 〈g1, . . . , gn−1〉, and S′
is a rephasing of S, we must have −h ∈ S. But then
h |φ(θ)〉 = |φ(θ + pi)〉 contradicting h being a stabilier of
|φ(θ)〉. Similarly if h ∈ S′. Therefore h /∈ S ∪ S′.
Proof of Lemma 6. We closely follow the proof of Propo-
sition 1 in [10]. The number of distinct stabilizer sub-
groups of the required form isG/A whereG is the number
of choices for the final generator h, and A is the number
of choices of h giving rise to the same subgroup.
First we calculate G. Ignoring phases there are 4n
choices in Gn. But h must commute with g1, . . . , gn−1
which gives 4n/2n−1 options. Also, it must not be
in the subgroup generated by g1, . . . , gn−1, which gives
4n/2n−1 − 2n−1. Finally, it must not be in S or S′,
i.e. it cannot be gn multiplied by something gener-
ated by g1, . . . , gn−1. There are two possible overall
phases ±1. This gives G = 2(4n/2n−1 − 2n−1 − 2n−1) =
2(4× 2n−1 − 2× 2n−1) = 2n+1.
Next we calculate A. Fix a stabilizer subgroup. Then
for h we can choose any of the elements of the stabilizer
subgroup not generated by g1, . . . , gn−1. This gives A =
2n − 2n−1 = 2n−1.
Finally we calculate G/A = 4 as required.
Appendix B: Relation to Spekkens’ new formulation
Spekkens’ has previously outlined [8] a new formula-
tion of the toy theory which is very closely related to
the stabilizer notation presented here. The new formu-
lation is based around “linear functionals” or “canonical
variables”. These can be put in 1-to-1 correspondence
with the elements of Gn with α = 1. For an elementary
system, the canonical variables are 0, X, P , and X + P
which may be taken to correspond to I, X , Z and Y
respectively. The correspondence for composite systems
can then be built up from this, so that X1 + X3 + P3
corresponds to X ⊗ I ⊗ Y and so on. The toy stabilizer
notation combines canonical variables with their values,
for example having X ⊗ Z in a toy stabilizer subgroup
represents knowledge that X1 +P2 = 0 whereas −X ⊗Z
represents the knowledge X1 + P2 = 1.
The new formulation’s “poisson bracket” condition for
jointly-knowable variables is exactly the usual condition
on the check vectors of commuting observables.
Measurements in the new formulation determine the
value of some set of jointly-knowable variables, or equiv-
alently a set of commuting toy observables. Therefore
Lemmas 3 and 4 show that for one or two systems the
notion of measurement is identical in both formulations,
whereas for three or more systems not all of the measure-
ments in the original formulation are included in the new
formulation.
The new formulation can be compared to qubit
quantum mechanics by using the discrete Wigner
representation[16, 17] of the latter. From this perspective
the difference between the two theories comes from the
fact the discrete Wigner function is sometimes negative,
whereas the toy theory only uses positive probabilities.
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